If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.

CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENCE

Punishment—Imprisonment for 10 years and fine—Cognizable—Non-bailable—Triable by Court of Session—Non-compoundable.

Comments

Abetment of attempt to commit suicide

(i) It has been held that once the offence of abatement of committing suicide is clearly made out against accused, despite the fact that specific charge under section 306 was not framed against accused, would not preclude court from convicting accused for offence found proved; Prema S. Rao v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao, AIR 2003 SC 11.

(ii) The basic constituents of an offence under section 306, are suicidal death and abetment thereof; Sangarabonia Sreenu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1997) 4 Supreme 214.

(iii) To attract the ingredients of abetment, the intention of the accused to aid or instigate or abet the deceased to commit suicide is necessary; Pallem Deniel Victoralions Victor Manter v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1997) 1 Crimes 499 (AP).

Sec. 302 and Sec. 306 – Basic distinction

Two offences under section 302 and section 306 are of distinct and different categories; Sangarabonia Sreenu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1997) 4 Supreme 214.

Sentence

For offence under section 306 the sentence may extend to ten years. In case the husband is found to have harassed his wife to such an extent as to drive her to commit suicide, sentence of five years would be proper sentence for the crime with the amount of fine of Rs. 20000 to be paid to the parents of the deceased; Prema S. Rao v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao, AIR 2003 SC 11.

Suicide—Meaning of

The ‘suicide’ is stated to mean as the intentional killing of oneself.

As per Concise Oxford Dictionary, 9th Edition, p. 1393

A finding of suicide must be on evidence of intention. Every act of self destruction is, in common language described by the word ‘suicide’ provided it is an intentional act of a party knowing the probable consequence of what he is about. Suicide is never to be presumed. Intention is the essential legal ingredient.

As per Halsbury’s Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Ninth Volume, pg. 686.

If any person under eighteen years of age, any insane person, any delirious person, any idiot, or any person in a state of intoxication, commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with death or 1[ imprisonment for life], or imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.

CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENCE

Punishment—Death, or imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for 10 years and fine—Cognizable—Non-bailable—Triable by Court of Session—Non-compoundable.

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1. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, sec. 117 and Sch., for “transporta­tion for life” (w.e.f. 1-1-1956).

1[304B. Dowry death.—(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or har­assment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called “dowry death”, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.

Explanation

For the purpose of this sub-section, “dowry” shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).

(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprison­ment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.]

CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENCE

Punishment—Imprisonment of not less than 7 years but which may extend to imprisonment for life—Cognizable—Non-bailable—Triable by Court of Session—Non-compoundable.

COMMENTS

Applicability

It was argued that the husband or any of his relative could be guilty of the offence only if he or she directly participated in the actual commission of the offence. This contention was rejected by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. It observed that in its real import, section 304B of the Indian Penal Code would be applicable if cruelty or harassment was inflicted by the husband on any of his relative for, or in connection with demand for dowry, immediately preceding the death by bodily injury or by burning. In short she should have died in abnormal circumstances within seven years of the marriage. In such circumstances the husband or the relative, as the case may be, will be deemed to have caused her death and will be liable to punishment; Vadde Rama Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1990 Cr LJ 1666.

Burden of Proof

The prosecution under section 304B of Indian Penal Code cannot escape from the burden of proof that the harassment to cruelty was related to the demand for dowry and such was caused “soon before her death”. The word “dowry” has to be understood as it is defined in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. Thus, there are three occasions related to dowry, i.e., before marriage, at the time of marriage and at an unending period. The customary payment in connection with the birth of child or other ceremonies, are not involved within ambit of “dowry”; Satvir Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 2001 SC 2828: (2001) 8 SCC 633.

Dowry

(i) Where the evidence revealed that accused—husband killed deceased—wife for not satisfying his dowry demand but nothing on record to show involvement of co-accused in-laws with the offence committed by the accused, co-accused in-laws are not guilty of offence under sections 304B; Patil Paresh Kumar Jayanti Lal v. State of Gujarat, 2000 Cr LJ 223 (Guj).

(ii) The parties were married on 24-5-1962. After staying in the matrimonial home for two months, she returned to her parents’ house and told them that her husband wanted a television set and a fridge. Her father gave her a sum of Rs. 6,000 and she left for the matrimonial home. Her husband again demanded a sum of Rs. 25,000 for purchasing a plot. Thereafter the husband took his wife to her parents’ home saying that he would not take her back unless a sum of Rs. 25,000 was paid to him. After one year he took her back but he did not give up the demand for Rs. 25,000. Soon thereafter she left for her parents’ home and came back with a sum of Rs. 15,000 with a promise that the rest of the amount would be paid later on. In her husband’s home she died of strangulation. The trial court found the accused guilty. The death of the deceased took place within seven years of marriage and persistent demands of dowry were made on her and she died under mysterious circumstances. The trial court framed charge under section 304B. The Supreme Court held that no ground for quashing the charge was made out; Nem Chand v. State of Haryana, (1994) 3 Crimes 608 (SC).

Essential ingredients

To attract the provisions of section 304B, one of the main ingredients of the offence which is required to be established is that “soon before her death” she was subjected to cruelty and harassment “in connection with the demand of dowry”; Prema S. Rao v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao, AIR 2003 SC 11.

Expression ‘soon before her death’: meaning of

The expression ‘soon before her death’ used in the substantive section 304B, I.P.C. and section 113B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity text. No definite period has been indicated and the expression ‘soon before her death’ is not defined. The determination of the period which can come within the term ‘soon before’ is left to be determined by the courts, depending upon facts and circumstances of each case. Suffice, however, to indicate that the expression ‘soon before would normally imply that the interval should not be much between the concerned cruelty or harassment and the death in question. There must be existence of a proximate and live-link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the concerned death. If alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence; Kaliyaperumal v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2003 SC 3828. See also Yashoda v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2004) 3 SCC 98.

Presumption: Applicability

(i) The presumption shall be raised only on proof of the following essentials:—

(1) The question before the court must be whether the accused has committed the dowry death of a woman.

(2) The woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives.

(3) Such cruelty or harassment was for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry.

(4) Such cruelty or harassment was soon before her death.

Kaliyaperumal v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2003 SC 3828.

(ii) In dowry death cases and in most of such offences direct evidence is hardly available and such cases are usually proved by circumstantial evidence. This section as well as section 113B of the Evidence Act enact a rule of presumption, i.e., if death occurs within seven years of marriage in suspicious circumstances. This may be caused by burns or any other bodily injury. Thus, it is obligatory on the part of the prosecution to show that death occurred within seven years of marriage. If the prosecution would fail to establish that death did not occur within seven years of marriage, this section will not apply; Ratan Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1994 Cri LJ 1684. See also, N.V. Satyanandam v. Public Prosecutor, AP High Court, AIR 2004 SC 1708.

Section 304B and Section 498A – Distinction

Section 304B is a substantive provision creating a new offence and not merely a provision effecting a change in procedure for trial of a pre-existing substantive offence. As a consequence, accused cannot be tried and punished for the offence of dowry death provided in section 304B with the mini­mum sentence of seven years’ imprisonment for an act done by them prior to creation of the new offence of dowry death; Soni Dev­rajbhai Babubhai v. State of Gujarat, 1991 Cr LJ (313) (SC).

Scope

(i) A perusal of section 304B clearly shows that if a married woman dies otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband in connection with demand for dowry, such death shall be called “dowry death” and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused the death. The conditions precedent for establishing an offence under this section are as follows:

(a) that a married woman had died otherwise than under normal circumstances; (b) such death was within seven years of her marriage; and (c) the prosecution has established that there was cruelty and harassment in connection with demand for dowry soon before her death; Baljit Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR 2004 SC 1714: (2004) 3 SCC 122.

(ii) Offence under section 304B of the Indian Penal Code is triable by the Court of Session. It is a cognizable and non-bailable offence. The minimum punishment for the offence is seven years imprisonment which may extend to life imprisonment. Section 304B applies not only when death is caused by her husband or in-laws but also when death occurs unnaturally whoever might have caused it. The section will apply whenever the occurrence of death is preceded by cruelty or harassment by husband or in-laws for dowry and death occurs in unnatural circumstances. It may be emphasised that occurrence of death in such circumstances is enough though death might not have been in fact caused by the husband or in-laws. Thus the intention behind the section is to fasten death on the husband or in-laws though they did not in fact caused the death. Thus a fiction has been created. It is because in these circumstances, the misery and agony created thereby which compels the unfortunate married woman to end her life; Premwati v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1991 Cr LJ 263.

Unnatural death

In-laws insisted dowry demands on one married young woman. Ultimately, it appeared that she was done to death and her body was cremated without sending any information to her parents or any relatives. The Supreme Court held that, if it was natural death, there was no need for the appellants to act in such unnatural manner and cremate the body in great and unholy haste without even informing the parents. In the result it was an unnatural death, either homicidal or suicidal. But even assuming that it is a case of suicide even then it would be death which had occurred in unnatural circumstances. Even in such a case, section 304B is attracted and this position is not disputed. Therefore, the prosecution has established that the appellants have committed an offence punishable under section 304B beyond all reasonable doubts; Shanti v. State of Haryana, AIR 1991 SC 1226.

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1 Ins. by Act 43 of 1986, sec. 10 (w.e.f. 19-11-1986).

1[304A. Causing death by negligence.—Whoever causes the death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.]

CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENCE

Punishment—Imprisonment for 2 years, or fine, or both—Cognizable—Bailable—Triable by Magistrate of the first class—Non-compoundable.

Comments

Automobile accidents

If there is an accident because of the negligence of the gateman in keeping the gate open and inviting the vehicles to pass, the driver of the bus cannot be held guilty of negligence; S.N. Hussain v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1972 SC 685.

Distinction between rash and negligent act

The appellant was charged with an offence under section 304A for causing death of one M by contact with the electrically charged copper wire which he had fixed up at the back of his house with a view to prevent the entry of intruders into his latrine. It was held that the voltage of the current passing through the naked wire being high enough to be lethal, there could be no dispute that charging it with current of that voltage was a rash act done in reckless disregard of the serious consequences to people coming into contact with it for which the accused is solely responsible under section 304A; Cherupin Gregory v. State of Bihar, 1964 (1) Cr LJ 138: AIR 1965 SC 205.

Scope

In order to impose criminal liability on the accused, it must be found as a fact that collusion was entirely or mainly due to the rashness or negligence; Munile Sao v. State of Bihar, (1997) 3 Crimes 200 (Pat).

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1. Ins. by Act 27 of 1870, sec. 12.

Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder shall be punished with 1[imprisonment for life], or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death,

or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, or with fine, or with both, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without any intention to cause death, or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.

CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENCE

Para I

Punishment—Imprisonment for life, or imprisonment for 10 years and fine—Cognizable—Non-bailable—Triable by Court of Ses­sion—Non-compoundable.

Para II

Punishment—Imprisonment for 10 years, or fine, or both—Cognizable—Non-bailable—Triable by Court of Session—Non-compoundable.

COMMENTS

Alteration of conviction

(i) Where the accused, who inflicted fatal injury on head of deceased which caused his death, without intention to kill him is liable to be convicted under section 304 Part II while other accused who inflicted sword injury liable to be convicted under section 324 IPC; Asu v. State of Rajasthan, 2000 Cr LJ 207 (Raj).

(ii) Where the accused was about 80 years at the time of occurrence and is totally bedridden, sentence reduced to period already under gone for the ends of justice; Dev Singh v. State of Punjab, 2000 Cr LJ 347 (Punj).

Punishment

(i) Where there were contradictions in evidence of prosecution witnesses on major issues including location of place of occurrence, number of persons participating in commission of offence and non-examination of doctor to establish cause of death and also non-examination of i.o., conviction of accused cannot be sustained; Sahdeo Prasad Sao v. State of Bihar, 2000 Cr LJ 242 (Pat).

(ii) Whether the plea of drunkenness can be taken as defence for claiming acquittal or for lessening sentence depends upon ‘inten­tion’ and ‘knowledge’ of the accused; Mirza Ghani Baig v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1997) 2 Crimes 19 (AP).

Scope

(i) Before an accused is held guilty and punished under first part or second part of section 304 a death must have been caused by the assailant under any of the circumstances mentioned in the five exceptions to section 300; Harendra Nath Mandal v. State of Bihar, (1993) 1 Crimes 984 (SC).

(ii) The accused inflicted bodily injuries on the deceased which were of such nature that they were likely to cause death. There can be no doubt that the accused intended to cause and did cause the injuries, therefore liable to be punished under the first part of section 304 of Indian Penal Code; Shanmugam alias Kulandaivelu v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2003 SC 209.

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1. Subs. by Act 26 of 1955, sec. 117 and Sch., for “transporta­tion for life” (w.e.f. 1-1-1956).